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ABSTRACT 
Cost shifting strategy in service organizations causes difficulties between co-existing internal 
business units each competing for scarce resources. Within regulatory and legal constraints, 
cost shifting between business units instigates concomitant changes to each unit’s 
profitability/budget-surpluses. For internal monopoly and competitive units, this strategy has 
shortcomings. Through management sponsored training programs, employee learning and 
productivity improvements offer a long-term approach to better address this short-term cost 
shifting problem. We mathematically model this solution, and outline further research that 
builds on this long-term cost shifting approach.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of cost shifting in service organizations remains a contentious issue in a 
number of disciplines, including cost accounting, management accounting, and regulatory 
economics (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, Brennan 1990, EBRI 1993, Gal-Or 1993, 
McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). Literature demonstrates cost shifting practices primarily 
involve of overheads such as those imposed or allocated by senior management, but this 
practice excludes costs incurred within a service department or business segment (Breautigan 
and Panzer 1990, Brennan 1990, Rogerson 1992, EBRI 1993, Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 
1998, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). 
Cost shifting is an organizational strategy rather than a policy (EBRI 1993). It helps to 
achieve organizational goals such as: achieving profit targets, maintaining market share, 
and/or providing planning and control directions (Rogerson 1992, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998). In 
USA defense industry, cost shifting between organizational units is used as a return on 
investment strategy (Rogerson 1992). Here, defense product buyers purchasing from 
monopoly units via sole supply contracts pursue increased product profitability by on-selling 
to other customers – often in non-strategic semi-competitive segments (Braeutigam and 
Panzar 1989, Breautigan and Panzer 1990, EBRI 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, McGowan 
and Vendrzyk 2002). Similar cost shifting practices arise in US public hospitals, and in other 
public utilities (Braeutigam and Panzar 1989, Breautigan and Panzer 1990, Brennan 1990, 
EBRI 1993).  
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Cost shifting offers short-term temporary organizational unit fixes - often at the 
expense of another internal business unit (EBRI 1993, Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, 
McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). Over longer time periods such resultant expenditure shifts 
and/or productivity cost shifts have received little academic attention (Gal-Or 1993, 
Cavalluzzo et al. 1998). Hence, this service organization study addresses the longer-term 
effects of cost shifting - without changing the status quo of the organization’s units involved 
in such cost shifts. 
This study adopts organization learning concepts (Hamilton and Tee, 2010) through 
an employer sponsored training program (Ni and Sun, 2009) and develops a theoretical utility 
sector organization approach capturing cost shifting and possible solutions. This hypothetical 
utility sector organization operates within budgetary constraints, and offers products through 
two opposing units - a monopoly unit, and a competitive unit. Here, cost shifting is assumed 
as offering short-term solutions (Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998) but also presents 
associated longer-term consequences such as productivity improvements and/or wage gains 
(Bartel 2000).  
In monopoly units, cost shifting initially increases costs of the recipient unit (see for 
example, Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, Holladay and Quiñones 2003, Keith and Frese 
2008, Aguinis and Kraiger 2009), but this recipient monopoly unit may receive senior 
management direction if its budget threshold is exceeded and resultant cost shift outcomes 
deliver losses over the longer-term. Production and operations management literature 
suggests senior management initiatives such as training and development, research and 
development, and/or process improvement are possible pathways to reduce the recipient 
unit’s cost shifted problems (Holladay and Quiñones 2003, Keith and Frese 2008, Aguinis 
and Kraiger 2009).  
Utilities are generally government service organizations (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, 
Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998). Hence, we adopt training as a preferred pure-services 
approach. Like others, we use overhead cost as a surrogate for efficiency and productivity 
within this utility monopoly unit (Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998), and adopt a utility 
strategic-planning period of five years (Langfield-Smith 2011). We map our investment in 
employee training against a projected increase in employee productivity, offset against the 
added overhead costs of the trainer (see Bartel 2000 for a review). The total costs of the 
monopoly and competitive unit at ‘pre cost shifting’ represent the ‘status quo’ baseline (in 
terms of cost efficiency, productivity, and target cost). Next we model against this baseline 
and deliver our assessment. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many regulatory economics-based studies tackle cost shifting (Breautigan and Panzer 
1990, EBRI 1993, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). Accounting literature also assesses cost 
shifting (EBRI 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002) with these costs 
usually defined as overhead costs (Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). 
Such costs usually arise from senior management considerations - where overheads are 
imposed (or allocated) as extras to the recipient business unit (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, 
EBRI 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). Such costs are shifted 
from one business unit to another to provide short-term relief for one unit at the expense of 
others (EBRI 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). 
 
2.1. Cost shifting: Strategy and profitability considerations 
In government defense units costs shift from external commercial units to monopoly 
internal units including production planning (Breautigan and Panzer 1990), improvements to 
the-bottom-line (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002), compliance 
3 
 
with regulations (Cavalluzzo et al. 1998), and the maximization of cost reimbursements from 
government (Braeutigam and Panzar 1989, Breautigan and Panzer 1990, Brennan 1990, 
McGowan and Vendrzyk 2002). Cost shifting is also driven by desires to increase profits 
(Rogerson 1992), or to minimize budget allocated costs (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, 
Brennan 1990), or to improve a strategic market (Gal-Or 1993, Cavalluzzo et al. 1998).  
Literature considers reasons and motivations for cost shifting. Sweeny (1982), and 
Brennan (1990) note utilities deliberately shift overheads from commercial units into their 
regulated units. This has impact on their production and/or output decisions. Rogerson (1992) 
also observes overhead cost shifting in contracts between competitive organizations and sole-
sourcing government units. Thomas and Tung (1992) show maximization of pension fund 
returns by defence contractors arises when commercial arrangements are moved into 
government units. Cavalluzzo et al. (1998) observes that in response to changes to the 
Monetary Control Act, costs shifted within two operating departments (from a competitive 
department and a regulated monopoly department) within the US Federal Reserve Bank. 
They conclude cost shifting help improve profitability within the competitive unit, allowing it 
to compete with similar services provided by external operations. They contend that this cost 
shifting did not change the status-quo of the monopoly segment. 
Cost shifting in healthcare typically arises with changes in policies on cost 
reimbursement or budgetary allocation. Carey (1994) and Eldenberg and Kallapur (1997) 
suggest changes in government reimbursement policies led US hospitals to shift allocated 
overheads from fixed reimbursement in-patient departments to flexible out-patient 
departments - where reimbursement depend on costs. Similarly, Soderstorm (1990, 1993) 
note in response to Medicare reimbursement changes hospitals shifted costs from cost-plus to 
fixed-fee diagnosis areas where higher reimbursement fees applied. Blanchard (1986) and 
Eldenberg and Soderstrom (1996) add that hospitals manipulate their budgeting rules to 
relieve revenue constraints such as cost-based reimbursement. Other health-care studies - 
such as EBRI (1993), find hospitals shift costs between payers - with some payer-groups 
paying more than others.  
In the regulatory sector, however, Arrow (1995) found no evidence that regional 
telecommunications providers shift costs from unregulated to regulated businesses or 
business units. Gal-Or (1993) offers a model where two firms sell products in two different 
niche markets – one in an oligopoly, and the other in a competitive market. She argues a firm 
can deliberately reallocate overhead costs from its oligopoly to its competitive units, and 
vice-versa. This improves either unit’s profitability (or its strategic position), and causes the 
competitor to shrink production levels and/or to suffer losses. In other public sector utility 
organizations cost shifting and productivity improvements sometimes lack clarity of direction 
and have encounter-competing internal cultures that can extend across opposing internal 
business units (Halachmi and Bovaird 1997, Niehaves et al. 2012).  
Hence, cost shifting may be used as a strategy to minimize cost and/or to improve 
profitability in selected business units within a service organization.  
The above approaches may be management driven, policy-based, or in response to 
regulatory demands. These shifts in costs are treated as short-term solutions, and are seldom 
considered over extended (5 year) time periods. 
 
2.2.  Cost shifting: Enlisting training of employee 
Workplace training improves individual, team, and organizational effectiveness 
through systematic developments in job-related capabilities (Goldstein 1993). These training 
activities result in the acquisition of new personal knowledge and in skills growth. Aguinis 
and Kraiger (2009) divide training into a five-zone continuum of: needs-assessment, design; 
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delivery; evaluation; and transfer-of-knowledge. Pure training resides at the lower end of this 
continuum with highest productivity increases arising at the upper training extremity. 
Needs assessment identifies skills gaps and defines suitable training programs 
(Blanchard 1986, Fowlkes et al. 2000, Baranzini et al. 2001). Although complementary, 
different training approaches/methods are independent, but each shares the objective of 
increasing productivity (Aguinis and Kraiger 2009) - including improved employee 
productivity (Heimbeck et al. 2003, Holladay and Quiñones 2003, Linou 2004, Keith and 
Frese 2008, Aguinis and Kraiger 2009) through the collective acquisition of organizational 
knowledge and by added employee capabilities. Keith and Frese (2005, Keith and Frese 
2008) and Aguinis and Kraiger (2009) state trainee meta-cognitive abilities can engage both 
training activities and knowledge acquisition. Here, learning materials can be imparted 
through: technology-driven instructions; remote training; and outcome-based training, but 
differing training methods best match certain types of trainees and their training 
environments. 
As trainees improve their individual performances they add to the organisation’s 
productivity increases, profitability, cost reductions and quality improvements (Aguinis and 
Kraiger 2009). Indirect organizational benefits such as: reduction in employee turnover, 
enhancement of organizational reputation, and development of social capital can also occur. 
Although, Aguinis and Kraiger (2009) also contribute to the changing personal and 
organizational productivities. This study narrows the training focus to cost reduction 
considerations - ones that impinge on organizational productivity increases. 
 
2.3. Cost shifting: Training and cost reduction considerations 
Changes in productivity created by training ‘scale effects’ hold associations with cost 
and productivity (Dutton and Thomas 1984, Bartel 1994, Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1999, 
Aghazadeh 2007, Almeida and Carneiro 2009). Cost shifting also drives staff productivity 
improvements and reduces costs over time (Terziovski and Sohal 2000). Here, new 
technologies (Theodorakopoulos et al. 2012), services technological systems improvements 
(Badescu and Garcés-Ayerbe 2009), research and development (Coccia 2012), and employee 
training/skills building (Terziovski and Sohal 2000, Ni and Sun 2009) can reduce costs, 
improve competitiveness, and build user perceptions regarding the services provided (Hu and 
Hsu 2008, Mansury and Love 2008, Hsieh et al. 2012). Literature adds this improvement is 
not always sustainable, but both internal efficiencies and effectiveness improvements often 
arise (Hu and Hsu 2008). For example, Shin and Park (2010) report a Korean ICT industry 
delivered 75% internal knowledge improvements and 150% cost savings, and in addition 
technological advances improve return on investment over time (Bartel 2000; (Bunduchi et 
al. 2011). 
Collating manufacturing cost reduction literature Dutton and Thomas (1984) state: 
‘…because of increase in production rate total unit cost reductions can be attributed not only 
to absorption of indivisible fixed costs but also to economies from Horndal-type adaptations 
that are facilitated by rate increases’. Darr et al. (1995) support this scale effect showing such 
knowledge and/or product-mix cost reductions emerged from added learning-by-doing or 
through increased experiential learning over time.  
Darr et al. (1995) observe knowledge transfer within franchises contributed to 
production increases and cost reductions, but these savings in manufacturing average unit 
costs and in knowledge advantages diminish over time. Sinclair et al. (2000) studied one 
thousand chemical manufacturers showing process innovation and research and development 
additions also deliver cost reductions. Here, manufacturing scale effect learning is both 
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technology-centred and employee centred (Santamaría et al. 2012), but learning-by-doing 
effects follow, and time lag behind: innovation, research and development, and procedural 
contributions to cost reductions (Ignatius et al. 2012).  
In contrast, a service organisation’s scale effects relate strongly to learning-by-doing 
productivity increases (Hamilton and Tee, 2010). Employees often directly drive change, 
learn more by ‘doing’, and strongly ‘own’ further productivity changes, and associated cost 
reductions. These employee gains are often retained longer (Darr et al. 1995). 
Efficiency gains through knowledge transfer across service organisational networks 
can reduce organizational costs. Lapré et al. (2000) argue knowledge base sciences offer 
productivity increases through employees who glean/apply such ideas to generate 
productivity gains. When top management intervenes to drive productivity changes, 
significant efficiencies and productivity improvements can be exposed (Finch, 2008), yet 
Lapré et al. (2000) failed to find significant productivity improvements from acquired 
knowledge across three production plants. Hence, managerial variables may not be deeply 
embedded across all productivity improvement initiatives.  
Cost reduction measured as time spent on experimentation, experience, and 
production volume (Sinclair et al. 2000) in a labour intensive chemical plant, reduces costs as 
production volumes increase (Liberman (1984 ). Argote et al. (1990) adds average costs do 
not change with high labour turnover, but others (Huselid 1995) argue high labour turnover 
disrupts both production and average costs in firms such as in shipyards.  
Sinclair et al. (2000) observes learning from continual production across units owned 
by the same firm (Darr et al. 1995), and across firms in close proximity (Jarmin, (1994b), also 
aids cost reductions.  
Several manufacturing studies note organizational cost reduction is temporal (Darr et 
al. 1995), but not-for-profit and government organizations may adopt further ways to reduce 
costs (Woodward et al. 1999, Kim 2005).  
As cost shifting drivers, and management imperative drivers differ over time, we 
deploy a hypothetical government-sector service organization applying training to explore the 
plausibility of cost reduction opportunities. We present scenarios where managers face 
different dilemmas around cost allocations (Gal-Or 1993), and we consider alternative 
solutions to the juxtaposition problem of cost shifting, cost reduction, and productivity 
improvement over the longer-term.  
 
3. SHORT TERM COST ALLOCATION AND COST SHIFTING DILEMMA 
Our hypothetical government-sector service organization is semi-profitable - with a 
monopoly unit, and a competitive unit, as its two operating arms. Its output and employee 
structure are considered fairly stable, and predictable. Our hypothetical service organization 
generates its income from grants, and from the commercial sales of services to its local 
communities. In any year, its main objective is to balance its budget within the monopoly 
unit, and to generate a surplus in the competitive unit.  
Our hypothetical government-sector service organization’s total costs comprise the 
direct costs of the units and shared overheads allocated by senior management. The 
performance of its monopoly unit reflects the compensation structure of the employees, and 
the work environment requirements. The total costs of these monopoly and competitive units 
drive their outputs - which are crucial in the auditing of ongoing government funding, and 
support their survival within the competitive local economy (cf. Breautigan and Panzer 1990, 
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Brennan 1990, Rogerson 1992). The control of costs also influences future monopoly grant 
funding and budgeting of its outside competitive services revenue streams. 
In a year, total costs [TCc] of the competitive services unit comprise direct costs [dcc] 
and a portion of allocated overheads - termed alpha [α]. Its operating environment is defined 
by the services provided, and by its geographical (or operational) areas of influence. It is 
profit driven, with prices set against its competitors.  
The relationship between total cost [TCc] and the average unit cost [ACc] for this 
competitive services unit is show as equations 1 and 2. 
 
α+= cc dcTC
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(2) 
where qc is the estimated output quantity of the competitive unit, dcc is all direct costs 
within the competitive unit measured as all fixed and variable production costs, and α ε [0,1] 
is the allocated portionof the imposed common support costs of the organization. 
Total costs of the monopoly services unit [TCm] again comprise the direct costs [dcm] 
of the department, plus the unallocated portion of overheads from the total overheads of the 
services organization [1- α]. The monopoly unit remains less concerned about spending levels 
(as it is protected by government legislation and funding grants). The monopoly services unit 
is not sufficiently lucrative to attract private sector competitors. Nonetheless, its stakeholders 
evaluate these budget levels. Equations 3 and 4 describe the monopoly services unit’s total 
costs [TCm], and its average unit cost [ACm].  
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Figure 1 presents the above starting-point cost allocations relationship, and Figure 2 
shows the new short-term cost shifting allocations relationship. 
 
<insert figures 1 and 2 about here> 
 
Short-term outputs show production quantity at normal capacity utilization levels, 
with average unit costs of each unit inversely related to production quantity.  
Under funding and government grant budget limitations, costs of each operational unit 
are typically under senior management scrutiny. If the monopoly unit’s budget exceeds its 
government legislated limit, the monopoly unit then becomes like a competitive unit, and is 
subject to rationalisation considerations.  
The monopoly and competitive units have no interdependencies but their overhead 
costs are complimentary. Where the competitive unit is under intense pressure to reduce the 
prices of its services, it advises senior management its overheads allocation against those of 
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the monopoly unit needs adjustment - possibly seeking monopoly unit employee 
retrenchments as a way to deliver overhead costs (salaries and on-costs) savings.  
Where senior management recognises significant inefficiencies exist within the 
monopoly unit it may transfer some poorly allocated overhead costs from the competitive 
unit to the monopoly unit. Hence the competitive unit remains successfully in the 
marketplace, and the monopoly unit with added overhead costs must become more efficient – 
possibly through enhanced training to generate added productivity (and not through job 
losses).  
Equations 5 and 6 show the new total costs and the new average costs of the 
monopoly unit. 
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where τ is the added costs to the monopoly unit 
In the monopoly unit as the production maximizes and approaches to the maximum 
threshold of the relevant range, the average unit costs reduce to minimum. This new cost 
sharing arrangement solves the competitive unit’s problem, but it challenges the monopoly 
unit to reduce costs within 5 years. This long-term approach is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
4. LONG-TERM COST ALLOCATION APPROACH 
Based on modelling, we envisage longer term solutions are best for government-sector 
service organizations. Our approach differs from past approaches used in regulatory 
economics (Breautigan and Panzer 1990, Brennan 1990, Gal-Or 1993) and is based on the 
following assumptions. 
a. Cost functions are linear within the relevant range 
b. Demand function is known with certainty for the sustained period of time (or during 
the training period) 
c. Training costs are upfront lump sum payments to the training provider 
d. Employee turnover during training exerts no significant influence on total 
productivity within the monopoly unit  
e. The size of the organization and its budgets for future years are constant during the 
training period  
f. Employees have opportunities to practice their acquired knowledge on their daily 
tasks, and all employees in the monopoly unit have shared understanding that their 
training is rewarding to them (for tenure and/or career progression), and to the 
monopoly unit. 
Where senior management offers external consultancy assistance to address the monopoly 
unit’s productivity issues, and a production training approach (with resultant skills and 
efficiency improvements) is provided to reduce extra-overhead costs over time, then training 
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cost [γ] is assigned to the monopoly unit’s overhead cost as it accrues the benefits from this 
approach. Figure 3 depicts this scenario. 
 
 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figure 3 is senior management’s initial step in solving the monopoly unit’s increased 
overhead costs over the long-term. This ‘ramp-up’ process captures the time from investment 
in training and R&D through to the time when the employees have learned to apply their 
newly acquired skills (Dutton and Thomas 1984, Adler and Clark 1991, Sinclair et al. 2000, 
Tether and Metcalfe 2003). Initially the monopoly unit’s total costs and average unit costs 
increase due to investment in training and R&D, whilst the employee training recipients 
initially remain at past productive levels.  
The long-term cost equation 7 is selected to match normal 5 year strategic planning 
and ‘rolling budget’ cycles (Finch, 2008).  
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The monopoly unit’s total training cost initially for the strategic planning period (five 
year budget period) [γ] gradually falls over time as employees apply their new productivity-
related skills (Adler and Clark 1991, Sinclair et al. 2000, Tether and Metcalfe 2003). As 
management implements consultant-driven productivity enhancement processes within the 5 
year time span initial increased costs are fully offset by an improvements gain of eta [ϑ] as 
per equation 8.  
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Here, we assume employee knowledge and skills are not degraded through 
productivity improvements over time – typically generated via technological improvements 
within the production process (and including waste reduction), along with enhanced 
management techniques (Finch, 2008). 
Continuous knowledge transfer across senior management and employees drives 
additional challenges in performing assigned tasks (Adler et al., 2010). This phase of abilities 
is labelled [ max→mqLim ]. Here, we assume tasks are performed manually/mechanically (Adler 
and Clark 1991), with technology-aided devices, and with cloud-engaging intelligent 
software driven processes (Demarest & Wang, 2010; Lyer, 2012).  
Equation 9 shows the monopoly unit’s final target as it considers its original equation 
3 cost [dc + (1 - α)], and then aims to reduce its final overhead cost below the original level 
[1-α]. 
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Under these conditions the monopoly unit approaches maximum productivity [
max→mq
Lim ], and its average unit cost approaches a minimum. This is shown through 
equation 10. 
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Hence, the average unit cost reduces to a minimum, and the monopoly unit keeps its 
overhead costs at or below original level. Figure 4 highlights this final scenario as the 
downward arrow component, and if the minimum cost is [TCn], it may lead to the beneficial 
inequality shown through Equation 11.  
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<Insert figure 4 about here> 
 
Provided the utility sector’s monopoly unit’s long-term cost reduction objective is 
achieved via costs shifting and productivity enhancements, both a minimization of average 
unit costs, and a maximization of productivity are conjointly approached. Hence, targeted 
productivity training programs linked to long-term overhead reductions offer a better 
alternative to straight short-term cost shifting strategies.  
Some suggest further managerial maneuverings such as staff reductions can further 
reduce costs but these may create degrees of employee demoralization (Argote et al. 1990, 
Adler and Clark 1991, Argote and Ingram 2000, Tether and Metcalfe 2003). Thus, to broaden 
the scope of the long-term cost shifting advantages presented herein, it may be wise to subject 
other productivity cost savings (ones not related to skills/technical training deliverance 
initiatives) to similar rigorous risk-return evaluations as those used in this study. 
 
5.0 IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Theoretical Implications  
We address productivity and cost reduction concerns in government-sector 
services/utility-sector organizations – especially those operating with shrinking revenue 
bases. We note short-term cost shifting offers little opportunities to raise performances. We 
assess employee training as a possible solution for productivity improvements and cost 
reduction and consider extended long-term time periods offer greater options.  
Our mathematical approach is of use to academics and practitioners seeking to 
identify root causes of typical inefficiencies associated with utility sector cost shifting 
between government sector organizational units (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, Hood 1995). 
Our theoretical, causal-chain approach adopts productivity-related organizational learning 
using employee training to demonstrate employee capability enhancements (such as learning, 
skills and knowledge creation) and the subsequent deliverance of productivity improvements 
(shown as cost reductions). This modeled approach is expandable by including other 
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productivity change generators such as datamined service gateways improvements into this 
mathematical model. 
 
5.2.  Practical Implications 
In Australia, public sector organizations can only charge customers for their services 
at or below government-regulated limits. Hence a monopoly unit incurring added shifted 
costs generates savings using alternate means such as utilizing training to increase employee 
capabilities and capacities (see for example, Braeutigam and Panzar 1989, Brennan 1990). In 
contrast, the services of the unregulated competitive unit being outside these regulatory price 
caps becomes subject to competitive marketplace pricing. Researchers are encouraged to 
deliver optional commercial approaches by benchmarking and comparing such cost-related 
areas under both short-term and long-term timeframes. 
 Our model shows over the long-term employee training is one option that potentially 
lowers the cost of service, and that two internal business units can strategically cost-shift – 
generating added servicing capabilities for the competitive unit, and building monopoly unit 
services efficiencies not possible under short-term approaches. Thus researchers are 
encouraged to approach cost shifting as a long-term approach, and to investigate cost shifting 
potentials as a means to enhance a government utility-sector’s net competitive and monopoly 
unit cost positions. 
Similarly, private organizations can be long-term tested using cost shifts between 
business units. Here, additional internal monopoly unit variables such as (1) computer-based 
intelligent suites; (2) workload/task efficiency and performance audits; (3) individual 
inefficiencies reductions; (4) strategic management long-term survival considerations; and (5) 
budgetary item analysis (Rogerson, 1992; Gal-Or, 1993; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998) can be 
similarly modeled to seek profit maximization and costs minimization. Considering private 
organization scaling business process reengineering, economies of scale, and wastage 
reduction (Bartel 1994, Berman and West 1998) can also be investigated. 
 
6. FUTURE RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
6.1.  Measurement Aspects 
Future research into other cost reduction effects such as: no-cost systems refinements, 
combined environmental and internal knowledge applications, and dynamic innovation 
effectors in time may offer short-term and long-term cost reducers, with various mixes 
applying to government sector units and/or to private (competitive) servicing environments.  
 
6.2.  Theoretical Aspects 
Our two-pronged cause-and-effect approach exposes a base level measurement 
approach into long-term cost shifting. There is considerable scope for researchers to 
investigate, resolve and so reduce the assumptions applied herein. 
 
6.3.  Management Aspects 
Managers can now recognize some effects created by their short-term attempts to shift
 
overhead costs, and can develop strategies to minimize these changes. This Australian 
government utility-sector approach shows managers allocating some training resources to the 
business unit incurring the cost shifting penalties but this unit can generate added growth 
benefits within its areas of responsibility. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Cost shifting strategy in service organizations creates different challenges to co-
existing internal business units when each competes for scarce resources. Within regulatory 
and legal constraints, cost shifting between business units instigates concomitant changes to 
each unit’s profitability/budget-surpluses. For internal competing units, this strategy has 
shortcomings. Through management sponsored training programs such as employee learning 
and productivity improvements long-term approaches are proposed in place of management’s 
normal short-term cost shifting approaches.  
Our mathematical approach addresses such longer-term effects of cost shifting. We 
model a semi-profitable government-sector service organization utilizing its two operating 
arms (monopoly unit, and competitive unit) both performing predictably in terms of output 
and employee engagement, and within a fairly stable/predictable environment. This long term 
(5 year) government utility-sector service organization approach shifts overhead costs to the 
monopoly unit, and improves the competitive unit’s profitability. The monopoly unit then 
uses employee training as a long-term strategic pathway to find efficiencies and productivity 
overhead cost reductions. Compared to alternate short-term cost shifting, our long-term 
approaches focus on increasing monopoly unit’s productivity outcomes whilst growing the 
competitive unit’s marketspace – thereby adding value to both units.  
We also outline current and future research opportunities that may be included in an 
expanded version of our model – thereby delivering additional cost reductions and further 
offsetting the effects of cost shifting. 
 
8. LIMITATIONS 
Throughout this long-term (5 years) two-pronged study, cost changes are assumed linear and 
the organization is operating under budgetary constraints. In addition, after cost shifting, and 
based on literature, employee training over-time is assumed to exert positive yet different 
capacity and capability effects on both the competitive and the monopoly units. 
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Figure 2: Cost shifting in the short term 
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Figure 1: Relationship between overhead costs, competitiveness, and efficiency. 
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Figure 4:  Target cost reduction after training and development activities 
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Figure 3: Cost reduction process in the longer term 
